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in~truction and, for that reason, may not have the benefit of
any misleading statement in the first paragraph. True, Rogers
,points to the second paragraph as erroneously stating to the
jury that it could consider his admissions or confessions as
part of the proof of the corpus delicti. But he also asserts
Jhat the instruction, as a whole, does not recognize the duty
9f the jurors to determine whether the corpus delicti was
proven, but only advises them of the legal principles which
guided the trial judge in ruling upon his contention, pre~ented upon an objection to the admission of evidence, that
the corpus delicti had not been established. "As a matter of
fact," argues Rogers, " the wording of the' instruction removes such responsibility from the jury hy declaring' i,t is for
the court to say whether there is sufficient evidence of the
corpus delicti to go to the jury.''' And in conclusion, he
quotes and makes a part of his argument the discussion in
People v. Hubbell, supra, concerning the misleading character of the instruction.
: The judgments are, and each of them is, reversed and the
cause remanded for a new trial.
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and
Schauer, J., concurred.

[Sac. No. 5368. In Bank.
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H. C. STROMERSON et al., Appellants, v. ROGER
AVERILL, Respondent.
[la,lb] Agency-Existence-Evidence-Su1H.ciency.-In an action
to quiet title, the evidence sustained a finding that plaintiff
was acting as defendant's agent in the purchase of the land
in question, where the contract of purchase was taken in plaintiff's name as vendee and, was delivered by him to defendant,
while he was in defendant's employ, with an assignment executed in blank, where defendant testified that plaintiff was his
McX. Dig. References: [1,3] Agency, § 15; [2] Quieting Title,
§ 89; [4] Evidence, § 562; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1243; ,[6] Appeal ,and Error, §l276; [7] Trusts, §131j [8] Trusts, § 144(1);
[9] Trusts, § 370; [10] Quieting Title, § 73; [11] Appeal and Error, § 966; [12] Quieting Title, § 136.

agent for all purposes and that it was plaintiff's duty under
the agency to carry the contract ir:. his name the. same as other
employees of defendant did as to other parcels of land, and
where this testimony was corrborated by sa~d employees and
others. Defendant's conduct, subsequent to plaintUf's discharge from his employ, iii. attempting to have a new contract
issued to him by filling in his name as assignee in the assignment which plaintiff had executed in blank; did not render
defendant's testimony unworthy of belief. '
[2] Quieting Title-Evidence-E:ffect of' Admission of Ownership
as to Other Land.-In an action to quiet title :, to land which
was being purchased under contract in plaintiff's name, as vendee, and which defendant claimed was being 'purchased, by
plaintiff as his agent, an admission made by defendant, at' tne
time plaintiff applied toa bank fora loan to ,make 'a final pa:y~
ment with respect to a previous and. similar transaction cov~
ering another tract, that plaintiff was theoWiiEir thereof, 'when,
taken in connection with defendant's later' assertion, of ownership to said tract on the theory that plaintiff purchased it as
his agent, did not conflict with his claim of ownership in this
action, as such admission could at most be considered only
with other evidence in determining the relationship of the p~
ties in the two transactions, or it might constitute impeachment on a collateral matter.
[3] Agency-Existence-Evidence-Su1H.cienc1.-In an action to
quiet title to land which was being purchased under contract
in plaintiff's name as vendee, defendant's testimony that plaintiff was acting as his agent in entering' into said contract was
not rendered unworthy of belief by the fact that, in' his correspondence with the vendor, he referred to the contract as
between the vendor and plaintiff.
[4] Evidence-Weight and Su1IicienCY~Necessit1of Oonsistency.

-Inconsistencies only affect the credibility of 'a witness or
reduce the weight of his testimony, and it'is for the trier of
the fact to weigh the evidence an4 determin!3 his credibility!
[5] Appeal-Questions of Law and' Fact-Ooniiderationof ,Evidence-Reconciling Con1li~s.-It is the dutr:of an appellate
court, 'in support of the judgment-' on appeal,. to harmonize'
apparent inconsistencies wherever possible.
[6] Id.-Questionsof Law a.nd Fact-Su1H.cienCy' 'of l:vidence to
Support Findings.-The sufficiency of 'evidenc~ ,to:esta:bllsh a
given fact, where the law requii-esproof 6f 'tne" fact 'to be

[4] See 10 Cal.Jur. 1146.
,
[5] See 2Cal.Jur. 938; 3 Am.Jur. 462.
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clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial
court to determine, and if there is substantial (,vidcnce to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on
appeal.
[7] Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Effect of Statute of Frauds.-A
constructivo trust which is created by operation of law need
not be in writing. (Sec Civ. Code, § 852.)
[8] ld.-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Duty by Fiduciaries.Where an employee, as agent, took a contract for the purchase
of land in his name for the employer and later repudiated his
fiduciary duty to hold the same for his principal, he became:
constructive trustee of the equitable title to the property. (See
Civ. Code, § 2224.)
[9] ld.-Actions-Pleading and Proof-Constructive Trust.-In
an action to quiet title to land which was being purchased
under contract in plaintiff's name as vendee, the facts giving
rise to a constructive trust were properly pleaded and found,
where defendant alleged that the contl'llct and equitable tItle
to the property belonged to him and that plaintiff executed the
contract at his request as his agent and employee, and where
a finding was made to such effect.
[10] Quieting Title - Pleading - Answer - Denials-Community
Ownership.-Where the complaint in a quiet-title action alleges that the property is the community property o~ plainturs,
and where the answer denies that plaintiffs are the owners of
or have any interest in the property, or in the contract of purchase, but alleges defendant to be the owner, there is a sufficient denial 9f any ownership of plaintiffs, including community ownership.
[11] Appeal- Review - Pleadings-Inconsistent Allegations in
Different Actions.-On an appeal by plaintiffs in a quiet-title
action, it was immaterial that defendant. brought a second action containing allegations inconsistent with his position in
the case on appeal.
[12] Quieting Title-Appeal-Determination.-In an action to
quiet title, where plaintiff as defendant's agent assumed persOllal liability under a contract of purchase from which ho
should be relieved, and wherc other outst:tnding obligations
might have beoll incurred by one party for the bencfit of the
other, a judgment for defendant was reversed and the callse
rcm:tnded to the trial co:urt to t!lke an accounting, with dircc-'
tions that a decree be made declaring that the legal title to
(7] Sec 12 Cal.Jur.

~!36 i

25 Cal.Jur. 161 i 26 R.C.L. 1233.
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the contract and the equitable title to the property were in
defendant, subject to the payment of any sums found due
plaintiff and to defendant's discharge of any obligation incurred by plaintiff on his behalf in connection with the prop.
erty.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ma-'
dera County. Ernest Klette, Judge assigned. Reversed .with
directions.
Action. to quiet title. Judgment for defendant reversed
with directions;
W. M. Conley, Philip Conley, Matthew Conley an:dConley,
' ,
Conley & Conley for Appellants.
Barcroft & Barcroft, David E. Peckinpah' and L. N .Ba:rbe~
for Respondent.
' ,, .
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs, K C. StroinersOlland. his:Wife,'
brought this action to quiet title to. a 562-acre tract which
was being purchased under contract from Miller:& Lux, Inc.
. in Stromerson's name. Defendant Averill alleged in his an~
swer that Stromerson acted as his agent in making the contract to purchase the land, denied plaintiffs had .any ,inter~
est therein and prayed that title be quieted in .him~ '. . . The;
court found in accordance with the allegationS "in: ,defend~'
ant's answer and plaintiffs appealed from the judgment for
defendant. For the purposes of clarity and. breVity H. C:
Stromcrson will be treated here as the sole piaintiff. .
..... ;.
The parties had been acquainted for many years, Stromer~.
son at one time having been employed by Averill in the contracting business. In 1933 Averill, who' was theii.farlnirtg on'
a large scale in Madera County, hired Stromersonas a foreman at a starting salary of $75, later increased to $150,per
month. Although Stromerson then had no agricUltural experience, he soon became a capable farmer and continued to work
for Averill in the capacity of foreman until he was discharged shortly before this action was commenced. Before
Stromerson was employed, Averill had adopted the practice
of having some of the land used in his extensive operations
held in the namcs of employees. This may have been partly
for the. purpose of avoiding a restriction on the amount that
could be loaned to one person by the bank which financed
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Averill. It appears that Averill had received the limit that
could be loaned to one person and the bank knew of the practice referred to. One ,tract of 475 acres purchased by Averill
from Miller & Lux was in the name of P. A. Davis, the farm
superintendent. Another tract of 640 acres, also bought from
Miller & Lux, stood in the name of a foreman, J. F. Lincoln.,
The combined farms, including the 562-acre tract here in~
volved, wer.e operated as a unit. Davis managed the farms
and, working under his direction, Lincoln and Stromerson
supervised the planting, cultivating and harvesting of the
crops. Averill determined matters of policy and took care of
financing the operations, which was handled in part through
advances made by the SanJoaquin Cotton Oil Company on
crop mortgages and the personal credit of Averill.
Bank accounts for the combined farming operations at one
time stood in the names of Averill, Davis and Stromerson, at
another time in a single account in the names of Averill,
Davis, Stromerson and Lincoln, then in four separate accounts, and finally in the name of Roger Averill and' Associates. E~cept in 1934; each of the four was authorized to
check on any of the accounts. The larger bills were paid by
AverHl or Davis, while Stromerson or Lincoln usually signed
checks for labor. Stromerson drew checks for his own salary
on these accounts. In making payments to meet the cost of
operating the several farms, checks were drawn without regard
to the source of funds in a particular account and without
reference to the tract for which the e~penditure was made.
Each year a budget was made for the operation of the several
farms and filed with the Cotton Company. Crop mortgages
were given by the different individuals to secure advances
made, but the money received therefrom was deposited by
Averill or Davis in the bank account which needed the money.
All notes were indorsed by Averill.
In the early part of 1936 Averill negotiated with Miller &
Lux for the purchase of the 562 acres in controversy. Nothing
was said to Stromerson concerning the transaction until it
was completed. The contract for this acreage was taken in the
name of Stromerson, as vendee. He executed an assignment
in blank on one copy of the contract and delivered it to A verill who deposited it with the Cotton Company as further
secnrity for advances. The initial payment of $1,775 was borrowed from Allen, the real estate agent who handled the transaction. The note covering the loan was signed by Averill,
Davis and Stromerson, and was later paid by' a draft issued
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by the Cotton Company and charged to A varin's" acicottiit~
The first installment was paid by Averill from his perscm.ai
bank account, the second installment, and only other payme.nt
before the commencement of this action, was paid' by a c~eck:
drawn by Averill on the account of Roger AvenU. aJid"AssOL
ciates;
' . , ' ". C,':; ,:.:.:],;.
Averill testified, as to the agency relationShip; that Str()in~
erson was his agent for all purposes, and that it 'was Stromerson's duty under the agency to carry the contract in Stromerson's name the same as Davis and Lincoln 'did 'as to other
parcels. It further appears that Averill offered Davis, Lin~
coIn and Stromerson a fifteen-year contract covering the operl.
ation of the several farms. , Davis testified that in the spring
of 1937 he discussed this offer with Lincoln and Stromersori.
and that' Stromerson said he did not want i to be tied up~
Stromerson stated that he would like a piece of land instead
and that he wanted 80 acres for his part. Davis testified that
in discussing the matter the three of them agreed that Lincoln should also have 80 acres and that Davis" should have
.140 acres. Stromerson further stated that Averill had promised him a percentage of the net income and Stromersonsaid
, that if the three of them would "stick together" they could
get some land from Averill. Although this conversation to()k
place shortly before Stromerson was discharged, and involved
the relation of the parties with reference to the combined
farming operations, nothing was said which indicates Stromerson was then making any claim to the ownership of the 562
acres. In fact, the inferences are plainly to the contrary.
[la] Stromerson contends the evidence is not sufficient to
support the finding that he was the agent of Averill in the
purchase of the 562, acres of land. The agency is established
by the testimony of Averill, but Stromerson asserts that Averill's testimony is "false, inherently improbable and unworthy
of belief." In support of this' aSSertion, certain' claimedin~
consistencies, contradictions and ad.missions m. Averill's tes~
. timony are pointed out. Reference is made to the fact that
after Stromerson was discharged Averill attempted to have
a new contract issued to him covering the 562 acres by :filling
in his name as assignee in the assignment which Stromerson
had executed in blank. Since Stromerson entered into the
contract as Averill's agent and delivered it to him' with an
88signment executed in blank, there was' certawy nothing in
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the conduct of Averill which compels a conclusion that his
testimony is unworthy of belief.
[2] It is also claimed that an admission made by Averill
with respect to another transaction was inconsistent with his
testimony concerning the ownership of the land in question.
.Shortly after Stromerson went to work for Averill a tractof
160 acres was purchased on contract from Miller & Lux and
the contract was taken in Stromerson's name. In 1935 Stromerson made application to a bank for a loan to make a final
payment on the purchase price. The loan was obtained and
the deed issued to Stromcrson. Averill admitted in substance
that he informed the bank that Stromerson was the owner.
Although the 160-acre tract is not involved here, and that
transaction occurred long before the purchase of the 562 acres,
it is argued that since Avcrill later claimed ownership to the
160 acres upon the theory that Stromerson purchased it as
his agent, such admission conflicts with his claim here. The
most that can be said of this contention is that the admission
could be considered with other evidence in determining the
relationship of the parties in the two transactions, or it might
constitute impeachment on a collateral matter, In this connection it is argued that inasmuch as it was determined in
another action that Stromerson was the owner of the 160-acre
tract, the judgment in this action should not be allowed to
stand because inconsistent therewith. (See Stromerson v.
Avert"lZ, 39 Cal.App.2d 118 [102 P.2d 571].) Although the
transactions were similar in many respects they differed .materially in some particulars, and we cannot say that wholly
inconsistent results have been reached in separate judgments
on the same issue.
'
[3] Stromerson also asserts that Averill's testimony is
unworthy of belief because his claim of ownership is inconsistent with references made in correspondence with Miller &
Lux to the "Stromerson contract" and the contract between
"yourselves and Stromerson." Since Stromerson was the
party named in the contract the identification of the instrument in this manner does not in any way conflict with A verill's version of the transaction.
Other instances of asserted conflicts and contradictions are
cited in' support of the contention that 'Averill's testimony
is so unworthy of belief that it should be entircly disreg-arded.
We haveearefully examined the evidence and find no merit
in the contention. [4] Inconsistencies only affect the credibility of the witness or reduce the weight of his testimony
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and it was for the trier of the fact to weigh the evidence
and determine his credibility. (10Cal.Jur. p. 1146, §364.)
[5] Furthermore, it is the duty of the court in support of a
judgment on appral to harmonize apparent inconsistencies
wherever possiblc. (2 Cal.Jur. p. 938, §551:) [lb] It might
also be noted that thc testimony of Averill was supported by,
many circumstances and corroborated. in important particulars
by Davis, Lincoln and others. In our opinion there was substantial cyidence to sustain the findinr, that Stromerson was
acting as Averill's agent in the purchase of the 562 acres of
hnd.
[6] It is contended, however, that since the judgment is
based upon constructive fraud the facts which are relied upon
to establish the fraud must be proved by clea,r; satisfactory
and convincing evidence. The sufficiency of evidence to establish It given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to,
be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial
court' to 'determine, and if there is substantial evidence to,
,support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review,
on appeal. (Steiner v. Amsel, 18 Cal.2d 48, 53, 54 [112 p.M
635] ; Steinberger v. Young, 175 Cal. 81,84, 85 [165P. 432] ;
Gouts v. Winston, 153 Cal. 686, 688, 689[96 P. 357].) " ".,"
[7] It is' also contended that the statute 9ffraudS b~rs',
recovery by Averill. A constructive trust which is created by:
operation of law need not be in writing (Civ.,Oo!ie, §852.).
[8] When Stromerson, as agent, tookthecop.tra:ct,.~:~U!; ,
name for Averill and later repudiated his fiduciary-duty,to -.
hold the same for his principal, he became constructi~e trn~;
tee of the equitable title to the property. (Civ~:Code,:§22~;,
Rest., Agency, §414; Rest., Restitution, §194 ; Williston . on
, '
Oontracts, rev. ed., voL 4, §Hi24.),
[9] It is urged that the facts giving rise· to the<con~truc~,
tivc trust were neither sufficiently alleged nor found;,Averill!
alleged that the contract and the equitable title to the prop-i
erty belonged to him and that Stromerson, executed the, contract at his request as his agoent and employee. 'l'he court:
found that in executing the agreement of purchase Stromer-!
son acted as the agent of Averill and that the contract was in,:
fact the contract of Averill,and that Averill is the equitable;
owner of the property. The facts necessary to give rise to the:
constructive trust were properly pleaded and found;
(10] Stromerson argues that by failure to denyanallega-

,
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tion in the complaint Averill. admitted "that the property
described herein is the community property of H. C. Stromerson and Leone Stromerson, his wife. " Averill did not specifically deny that particular allegation. He did, however,
deny that the stromersons were the owners of or had any
interest in the property or the contract and alleged himself
to ,be the owner, thereby answering the allegation of owner~
ship.
Other errors are claimed with reference to the admission of
evidence which do not merit discussion. Weare satisfied that
in most of the instances no error occurred, while in others if
error was committed it was not prejudicial.
. [11] Stromerson has requested leave to introduce additi!>nal evidence. It appears that after t!J.is appeal was taken
Averill commenced an action against Stromerson to recover
$35,572.69 allegedly due on an open book account and representing moneys loaned arid advanced to improve the 562 acres.
A writ of attachment was issued in that action and levied
upon the property here involved. It is argued that such con~
duct is inconsistent with the claim of agency and the further
claim of ownership by Averill. The second action was brought
to prevent the running of the statute of limitations during
the pendency of this appeal. The situation is somewhat analogous to the pleading of inconsistent defenses one of which
cannot be used to destroy the other. (See Miller v. Chandler,
59 Cal. 540; Billings v. Drew, 52 Cal. 565; Harding v. Harding, 148 Cal. 397 [83 P. 434] ;Buhne v. Co,rbett, 43 Cal. 264;
Calexico Lumber Co. v. Emerson, 54 Cal.App. 239 [201 P.
612] ; 21 Cal.Jur. 134.) The fact that Averill brought a second action containing allegations inconsistent with his position in this case is not material on this appeal.
[12] We are of the opinion, however, that the judgment does
not dispose of all of the conflicting claims of the parties connected with the acquisition, operation and development of the
property. Stromerson, assumed personal liability under the
contract of purchase from which' he should be relieved. It
further appears that other outstanding obligations may have
been incurred, or expenditures made, by 'one party for the
benefit of the other, in relation to the joint farming operations, and that an accounting is required in order to do complete equity.
'
The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded
to the trial court to take such accounting. The court shall
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thereupon make a decree declaring the leg8.1 title,to the'cori~. '
tract of purchase and the equitable title to the prop~rty'i8re
in Averill subject to his payment of any' suriIs fo'tui,(rdl1~
Stromerson and to the discharge by Averill ·of anyobliga~
tions incurred by Stromersonon his behalf m: .Conln.~etidfi
with the property. Each party shall pear 'his O~cCists 'on.
this appeal.
.
. .. "
'. f
""i;','

Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J.,con1
curred. Carter, J., did not participate.
ii. . .
','; • r1'~

. ' ,.. , "

:

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. It was incumbEmt'upo~:defend
ant to support his contention that Stromersdn ;'WtUj 'his' 'agent
and.held the equitable title to the properly' as'conatructive
trtlstee,under the rule that the evidencein$Uch1Jh'a.~e$'m:ust
be ,i clear, satisfactory and convincmg; explicit-/tinequivoca!
and indisputable." (Wehle v:. Price, 202 Ca1.3!}4,' 391 [260
P. R78] ; Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, 219 Cal. 548,554 [27 P.2d
898] ; Woods v. Jensen, 130 Cal. 200, 203 [62 P. 473]'; Skte~
han v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 193 [58 P. 543] ; Plass v. Plass,
122 Cal. 3, 12 [54 P. 372] ; Taylor v. Bunnell, 211 Cal. 601
[296 P. 288] ; Olson v. Olson, 4 Cal.2d 434 [49 P.2d 827] ;
see Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, vol. 1, p. 231; ,23 A.L.R.
1500; 65 C.J. 325.) It is my opinion that the trial court did
not observe this rule in weighing the evidence in the present
case. It is apparent that there was some c,ooperative arrangement between Stromerson, Averill, Lincoln, and Davis, and
the evidence suggests a partnership.' It does not in my opinion warrant the conclusion that it is highly probable that the
relationship between Averill and Strom~rson in the purchase
of the land in question was that of'principal and· agent. If
there was no agency there could be no trust under the authorities relied upon in the majority opinion.
.... '
While it rests primarily with the' trial ~ourt't() determine
whether the evidence is clear and convincing, its'findi,ngis not .
necessarily conclusive, for in cases governed by the .rule requiring such evidence "the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding should be considered by the appellate court
in the light of that rule." (Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal.
189, 193 [58 P. 543] ; see, also, Moultrie ·v. Wright, 154 Cal.
520 [98 P. 257].) In such cases it is the duty of the !lPpeliate
court in reviewing' the evidence to determine, not simply
whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it
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is more probable that the fact to be proved exists than that
it does not, as in the ordinary civil case where only a preponderance of the evidence is required, but to determine whether
the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it is highly
probable that the fact exists. When it holds that the trial
court's finding must be governed by the same test with relation to substantial evidence as ordinarily applies in other civil
cases, the rule that the evidence must be rlear and convincing
becomes meaningless. It is a contradiction that while the
vitality of the rule is thus destroyed its soundness is not questioned. If, as in my opinion, the rule is sound, this court has
crred in its pronouncement"! (see 25 Cal.Jur. 248; 2 Cal.Jur.
921) declining to accept responsibility for its enforcement.
Appellants'
. petition for a rehearing was denied October 30,
1943. CurtIs, J., and Schauer, J., dissented on the ground
that appellants should recover their costs of appeal. Traynor,
J., voted for a rehearing. Carter, J., did not participate
therein.

[So F. No. 16905. In Bank.

Sept. 1943J

[la,lb] War-Prico Control-Jurisdiction-Determining Constitutionality of Act.'-In 'a mandamus proceeding to compel a
state court to entertain a COnsumer action under the federal
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (56 Stats.L. 23; 50
U.S.C.A.App. §§ 901-946), the court has jurisdiction. to determine the constitutionality of the act itself; and it is
not foreclosed in this respect by the provision (see § 204(d) ;
50 U.S.C.A.App. § 924) that no court shall have power to
stay, etc., any provision of the act, although such provision
docs prohibit a court, other than the Emergency Court of
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 6-8] War, § 10 j [3] Constitutional
Law, § 37-j [4] Constitutional Law, § 51j [5] War, § 1; [9] Conflict
of Laws, § 1; [10] Courts, § 28j [11] Justices of the Peace, § 147;
[12] Mandamus, § 37.

v.

MUNICIPAL COURT
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[2]

[3]

[4]

Sept 30, 1943.J

BRADSTREET MILLER, JR., Petitioner, v. MUNICIPAL
COURT OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et a1., Respondents; PRENTISS M. BROWN, Administrator, Of~
flce of Price Administration, Intervener.

MILLER

[6]

[6]

Appeals, from entertaining an action brought to dete~ine
the constitutionality of the act.
Id.-Price Control-Administrative Remedy-Application.Inasmuch as the administrative remedy and the,' procedure
for judicial review, prescribed by the federal Emergency Price,
Control Act of 1942 (56 Stats.L. 31, §§ 203, 204; 50 U.S.C.A.
App. §§ 923, 924) are provided primarily to give opportunity
for challenging the validity of an order, regUlation or price
schedule, the fact that the defendant in a consumer action
did not challenge the act by such procedure does not foreclose
consideration of the question in a mandamus proceeding to
compel a court to entertain such action.
Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Power to
Nullify Statutes.-It seems that Congress in enacting a statute
and conferring on state courts jurisdiction over actions thereunder may not foreclose such courts from considering the constitutionality of the act. (See U.S.Const., art. VI, § 2.) ,
Id.":"'Constitutionality of Statutes-Construction.-If a statute is susceptible of two constrnctiOIis, one of which will render
it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or
in part, or raise serious and doubtful' constitutional questions,
the court will adopt that construction which,without doing
violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used,' will
render the act valid in its entirety, or, free from .doubt as to its
constitutionality.
War-Extent of War Power.-The warpowar of the Federal
Government is not created by the emergency of war, but is a
power given to meet that emergency, which extends to every,
matter and activity so related to war as substantiallY to affect
its conduct and progress.
"
Id.-Price Control-Constitutionality of, Act.-'-ThfJ control:of '
prices of commodities is a constitutional 'asPect,~'of:;t~e\v~r

:i"" "

power.
, , ' , "'" " " ";'i":'
[7] Id.-Price Control-Constitutionality of Ac1i.~The' fe'deral
Emergency Price Control Act' of 1942" (56St~ts.L:' 2grj5~
U.S.C.A.App. §§ 901-946) does 'not unconstitutionally deleglit'~ ,
legislative powers to an administrative o f f i c e r ; ' "
[8a,8b] Id.-Price Control-Consumer' Action~urisdiction.~A·
state court of competent jurisdiction' must entertain a ,eonsumer action authorized by'the federal Emergency PrieeControl Act of 1942 (56 Stats.L. 33, § 205(e) j 50 U.S.C.A.App.
[4] See 5 Cal.Jur. 615; 11 Am.Jut. 725.

